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Sarah Gilcrest 
I. Introduction 
While the rise of third-party funding agreements helped 
parties arbitrate their claims without harming their bottom 
lines, there is a high potential for unforeseen conflicts of 
interest to arise. The arbitral community is fairly small, 
with arbitrators having repeat appointments, counsel 
representing various parties, and funders pulling the purse 
strings.  
This paper defines a conflict of interest within a third-
party funding context and takes a look at why mandatory 
disclosure is important for the future of third-party funding 
and the arbitration community as a whole. It also analyzes 
the role states can play in supporting the legitimacy of 
arbitration through legislation. Of course, legislation is not 
necessarily the quickest method, but it is the most 
enforceable. The arbitral community should lean on the 
enforceability of hard law to require mandatory disclosure 
of the existence and identity of third-party funders. 
Requiring parties to disclose funding not only helps avoid 
conflicts of interest throughout an arbitration, but it can 
also lead to more enforceable awards and increase 
participation and trust in the system, while still maintaining 
the confidentiality of the process. 
In this paper, I explain the mechanics of third-party 
funding and the types of funders who provide monetary 
support to claims. Second, I explain the types of conflicts 
that can arise when third party funding is involved in a 
dispute, and better define what a conflict of interest actually 
means within a third-party funding context. Finally, I argue 
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that requiring parties to disclose the name and existence of 
any funder throughout the course of an arbitration can help 
avoid conflicts throughout the process, lead to greater 
enforceability, and increase participation and trust in the 
arbitral process.  
II. What is Third-Party Funding and Who Are 
These Funders? 
This paper adopts the following definition and 
description of third-party funding loosely based off the 
definition provided in the Queen Mary Report: third-party 
funding is when a party (generally the claimant, but in a 
small number of cases, the respondent), an affiliate of the 
party, or the law firm representing that party funds a claim 
by receiving financial support from a third-party financial 
institution.1 These arrangements either come in the form of 
equity or debt instruments, full or partial transfer of the 
claim, and risk avoidance instruments.2 These are large 
loans that can cover legal fees, administrative costs, expert 
fees, or even the business operating expenses of the party.3 
A particular feature of these loans is that they are non-
 
1 Report of the ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force on Third-Party Funding 
in International Arbitration, The ICCA Reports No. 4 92 (April 2018) 
(The term ³third-part\ funder´ refers to an\ natural or legal person Zho 
is not a part\ to the dispute and is not a part\¶s legal counsel, but who 
enters into an agreement either with a party, an affiliate of that party, or 
a law firm representing that party: (a) In order to provide material 
support for or to finance part or all of the cost of the proceedings, either 
individually or as part of a specific range of cases, and; (b) Such 
support or financing is provided through a donation, or grant, or in 
exchange for remuneration or reimbursement wholly or partially 
dependent on the outcome of the dispute).  
2 Burcu Osmanoglu, Third-Party Funding in International Commercial 
Arbitration and Arbitrator Conflict of Interest, 32 J. Int¶l Arb. 325, 329 
(2015).  
3 Yves Derains, Foreword to Third-Party Funding in International 
Arbitration, ICC Dossier No. 752E, 5 (2013). 
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recourse, meaning that if the claimant or respondent is 
unsuccessful, they do not have to repay the funder.4  
The International Bar Association (IBA) 2014 
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest5 defines third-party 
funding as ³an\ person or entit\ that is contributing funds 
or material support to the prosecution or defense of the case 
and that has a direct economic interest in the award to be 
rendered in the arbitration.´6 This excludes other types of 
funding like bank loans, intra-group financing, and 
philanthropic financing from non-governmental 
organizations.7  
Third-party funders can either specifically focus on 
third-party funding or use this type of financial instrument 
as a way to diversify their portfolios.8 Generally these 
specialized firms are in countries with well-developed 
third-party funding industries and legal systems like 
Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.9  
III. What is a Conflict of Interest? 
The rise of third-party funding in arbitration and the 
small community of arbitrator-lawyers can create a perfect 
 
4 Jennifer A. Trusz, Note, Full Disclosure? Conflicts of Interest Arising 
from Third-Party Funding in International Commercial Arbitration, 
101 Geo. L.J., 1649, 1653 (2013). 
5 Hereinafter the ³IBA Guidelines´. 
6 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 
13 (adopted Oct. 23, 2014) (updated Aug. 5, 2015) (citing Explanation 
of General Standard 6(b)). 
7 Id.  
8 Victoria Shannon Sahani, Lisa Bench Nieuwveld, Third-Party 
Funding in International Arbitration 3, 1-20 (2d ed. 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3046300 (noting Chapter 1: Introduction to 
Third-Party Funding). 
9 Id., at 3. 
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storm of conflict of interest issues between the parties and 
the arbitrator. For example, if a party appointed arbitrator 
has had extensive dealings with a funder or has a financial 
stake in the funder¶s business dealings, this could negate 
the neutrality of the tribunal as one of the arbitrators is 
predisposed to favor a funded party. Or at least, set the 
tribunal¶s decision up for an impartialit\ challenge. 
Unfortunatel\, tr\ing to asses a ³conflict of interest´ and 
Zhether that conflict could impact the tribunal¶s decision-
making abilities is a difficult process because there is no 
one universal definition. Neither institution rules nor state 
legislation truly define when conflicts arise, and under what 
circumstances. Instead, they suggest guidelines, possible 
situations to look out for, and what type of test to apply 
when analyzing conflicts issues. This is helpful but offers 
about as much clarity as a partially fogged mirror.  
Taking into account the difficulty of truly figuring out 
whether a conflict of interest strongly influences an 
arbitrator¶s impartial decision-making capabilities (for 
better or worse, individuals in society cannot read minds), I 
propose the following standard based off institutional 
guidelines, existing case law regarding arbitrator 
impartiality challenges, and national legislation: 
A conflict of interest arises when there is a 
direct and dependent relationship between the 
funder and the arbitrator where the outcome of 
the case significantly affects: (1) the financial 
performance, profitability, or share price of the 
funder, or (2) the arbitrator¶s personal financial 
interests. 
This definition of a conflict of interest within a third-
party funding context will not only be used as a reference 
point for the rest of the paper but should be adopted as the 
standard when analyzing third party funding conflicts. This 
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is because it is just narrowly tailored enough to apply to the 
nuanced relationship between funders and tribunals, but it 
also sets itself up for application in existing litmus tests 
used by institutions and states.  
Arbitral and other legal institutions (like the IBA), 
while great in many ways, have largely refrained from 
adopting one uniform definition of a conflict of interest. 
Instead, they just generally support the idea of an objective 
test. UNCITRAL for instance, in trying to define what an 
impartial and independent arbitrator can mean, explains 
that ³impartialit\´ is a subjective test, regarding the 
arbitrator¶s state of mind, Zhereas ³independence´ is an 
objective test that looks to the arbitrator¶s relationships 
with the parties or funders.10  This is why the IBA 
Guidelines also adopt a reasonableness test. The IBA 
Guidelines explain standards for what constitutes a 
reasonable doubt regarding an arbitrator¶s potential for bias 
and a possible test for disqualification. General Standard 
2(c) states:  
³Doubts are justifiable if a reasonable third person, 
having knowledge of the relevant facts and 
circumstances, would reach the conclusion that 
there is a likelihood that the arbitrator may be 
influenced by factors other than the merits of the 
 
10 See, e.g., Blackaby Nigel et al., Redfern and Hunter on International 
Arbitration ¶ 4.77, 1028 (6th ed. 2015); Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman 
on International Commercial Arbitration, ¶ 1028 (Emmanuel Gaillard 
& John Savage eds., 1999); Amelie Abt, Arbitration in Germany: The 
Model Law Practice  § 1036 at 25, (Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Stefan 
Kroll, Patricia Nacimiento eds., 2d. ed. 2015) (for German arbitration 
law); 50 para. 7; Judgement of 10 June 2004, Bargues Agro Industrie 
SA v. Young Pecan Cie,, XXX YB Comm. Arb. 499, 503 (Paris Cour 
d¶appel) (2005) (for French arbitration laZ); Judgement of 27 June 
2012, X. v. Y. Inc., Swiss Federal Tribunal, 4A_54/2012 ¶ 2.2.1. (for 
Swiss arbitration law).  
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case as presented by the parties in reaching his or 
her decision.´11  
General Standard 3(a) outlines a test for 
disqualification, but only when testing for the appearance 
or likelihood of bias. It uses an objective standard with a 
high threshold to prove.12 Fortunately, in an effort to prove 
some sort of more substantial guidance on what could be a 
conflict of interest, the IBA has created red, orange, and 
green lists with red meaning a high likelihood of bias, 
orange meaning a medium likelihood of bias, and green 
meaning a low likelihood of bias. Generally, the list 
equates a higher likelihood of bias with: (1) the closeness 
of a relationship between an arbitrator, the party, an 
affiliate of the party, or the law firm (2) financial interest in 
the outcome of the claim; and (3) the length of the 
relationship between the arbitrator and the party, an 
affiliate of the party, or the law firm.  
The red list is separated into two categories: non-
waivable and waivable situations. Non-waivable situations 
include: the arbitrator being a manager, director, or member 
of the supervisory board, having a controlling influence on 
one of the parties or an affiliate, having a ³significant 
financial or personal interest in the outcome,´ or regularl\ 
advising the party and its affiliate, of which they derive 
³significant financial income.´ ³Waivable´ offenses 
include situations where the arbitrator has relationship to 
the dispute (whether through prior involvement or given 
legal advice on the dispute to a party or affiliate), they have 
a direct or indirect interest in the dispute, or there is a 
current and slightly substantial relationship to one of the 
 
11 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 
13 (adopted Oct. 23. 2014) (updated Aug. 5, 2015) (citing General 
Standard 2(c)). 
12 See id. (citing General Standard 3(a)). 
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parties, or its affiliates. The orange list is similar to the 
waivable red list offenses, but only takes into account small 
services or relationships within the past three years. Green 
includes situations where the arbitrator has previously 
expressed legal opinions, currently renders services for one 
of the parties, or has contacts (rather than a relationship) 
with another arbitrator or with counsel for one of the 
parties. 
Recentl\, the ICC released a ³guidance note´ regarding 
arbitrator conflicts of interest. 13 According to the President 
of the ICC¶s International Court of Arbitration, Ale[is 
Mourrp, the note is aimed at ³ensuring that arbitrators are 
forthcoming and transparent in their disclosure of potential 
conflicts.´14 It does not address third-party funding 
specifically, but defines one potential conflict of interest as 
having a ³business relationship.´ Thus, it can inferred that 
an arbitrator having a business relationship with an affiliate 
or a personal interest of any nature can include a significant 
financial interest in the outcome of the case could have a 
potential conflict of interest.  
Fortunately, there are some ICSID cases that shed light 
 
13 Burcu Osmanoglu, Third- Party Funding in International 
Commercial Arbitration and Arbitrator Conflict of Interest, 32 J. Int¶l 
Arb. 325, 348 (2015) (³According to unconfirmed information, the ICC 
is considering including third-party in funding in its arbitration rules.´) 
(while it is generally frowned upon to base an argument off of rumors 
in an academic research paper, it looks like the rumors published in this 
article came to fruition as evidenced b\ the ICC¶s guidance note 
released in 2018 advising parties on potential conflicts arising from the 
use of third-party funding). 
14 International Court of Arbitration, Note to Parties and Arbitral 
Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration Under the ICC Rules of 
Arbitration (2019), 
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/03/icc-note-to-
parties-and-arbitral-tribunals-on-the-conduct-of-arbitration.pdf. 
(Quoting Alexis Mourre).  
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on how tribunals have attempted to define conflicts of 
interest regarding third party funding. For the most part, 
these cases have used an objective test to evaluate based on 
a ³reasonable evaluation of the evidence b\ a third-
part\.´15 The subjective belief of the requesting party is not 
enough to satisfy the requirements of the convention.16 
For instance, an arbitrator simply being in a leadership 
position as a funder is not enough to merit a successful 
claim of arbitrator bias. In Suez Vivendi v. Argentina,17 
Argentina challenged the Claimant¶s arbitrator appointment 
because it believed that her position as a board member of 
UBS was enough to violate the neutrality requirement. The 
council applied an objective standard ± stating that the 
subjective belief of the requesting party is not enough to 
satisfy the requirements of the convention. And that as a 
result of the relationship between an arbitrator and a funder, 
a manifest lack of independence and impartiality of 
judgment must be demonstrated to a reasonable person. 
They looked at the following elements to determine 
whether a reasonable person would think that the 
challenged arbitrator could be biased: (1) proximity of the 
connection between the challenged arbitrator and the party; 
(2) intensity and frequency of the interactions between the 
challenged arbitrator and the party; (3) dependence of the 
challenged arbitrator on the party; (4) materiality of the 
benefits accruing to the challenged arbitrator as a result of 
the alleged connection.  
Applying this four-prong test to analyze the proximity 
and type of relationship between the arbitrator and the 
 
15 Suez, Sociedad General De Aguas De Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A.  v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/199 
(Investment disputes). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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funder, the tribunal concluded that simply holding an 
advisory position on a large multi-national bank is not 
enough to disqualify an arbitrator. It is not about the type of 
relationship, but the closeness and influence the funder and 
arbitrator might exercise over the other. The tribunal ruled 
that ³an\ connection betZeen Prof. Kaufmann and the 
Claimants is remote and certainly not direct´ because her 
directorship at UBS was merely supervisory and had no 
involvement in the day-to-day management of the 
corporation. Regarding element (2), there was no 
interaction at all between Prof. Kaufmann and the 
Claimants because of her UBS directorship. Regarding 
element (3), the tribunal said, ³Prof. Kaufmann derives no 
benefits or advantages from and is in no way dependent on 
the Claimants as a result of the alleged connection.´ 
Further, ³UBS shareholdings in Claimant are not material 
to UBS financial performance, profitability, or share price 
and in no way affect the compensation that Professor 
Kaufmann earns as a director of UBS.´ As a result, Prof. 
Kaufmann¶s directorship did not create a manifest lack of 
independence and impartiality of judgment. Even multiple 
appointments are not enough to give a reasonable third-
party an appearance of bias. There must be a relationship of 
dependence.18  This decision further illustrates that the 
relationship between funders and arbitrators can be 
complex and nuanced. Mandatory disclosure of the 
existence of any type of funder can help prevent challenges 
from being raised after the tribunal¶s decision has been 
made, because it requires the parties to continuously do a 
conflicts-check. However, creating an institutional 
 
18 Universal Compression v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/9 ( 
³Prof. Stern indicates that she has been appointed multiple times b\ 
various law firms, but that a relationship of dependence, which could 
endanger her independence or impartiality, does not exist here or 
elseZhere.´). 
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guideline is not enough ± the arbitral community must look 
at national legislation as well.  
While institutional guidelines and arbitral decisions are 
important to look at to understand general trends and 
interpretations of guidelines, it is still important to note that 
they are not legally binding as national legislation. National 
legislation of the ³big´ arbitral seats (United States, United 
Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore),19 also outlines tests for impartiality. The 
Federal Arbitration Act requires parties to establish 
³evident partialit\´ to succeed in challenging an aZard.20 
HoZever, there is no set standard regarding ³evident 
partialit\.´21 England and Wales do not have a statutory 
definition regarding arbitrator impartiality, but have 
developed a test through case law calling for the arbitrator 
to use a ³state of mind Zhich is free from an\ influences 
extraneous to the merits which is capable of dispassionate 
inquiry and an objective judgment, and which is not turned 
aside by any motivation to favour one side as against the 
other."22 Case law goes on to establish an objective test 
stating "whether the fair-minded and informed observer, 
having considered the facts, would conclude that there was 
a real possibility that the tribunal was biased."23  
France also adopts a reasonableness test which aims to 
review any circumstance that may influence an arbitrator's 
 
19 Aceris Law LLC, The Seat of Arbitration in International 
Commercial Arbitration (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://www.acerislaw.com/seat-arbitration-international-commercial-
arbitration.   
20 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1947). 
21 Id. 
22 See Roylance v. The General Medical Council PC ([1999] 3 WLR 
541). 
23 See Porter v. Magill, HL ([2002] 2 AC 357); see also A & Ors v B & 
Anor [2011] EWHC 2345 (Comm). 
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judgment and create in the minds of the parties¶ reasonable 
doubts as to his impartiality or independence. For example, 
in Creighton v. Qatar, the court stated: ³it is incumbent 
upon the judge of the lawfulness of the arbitral award to 
assess the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator, 
by pointing out any circumstance of such a nature as to 
alter his/her judgment and create a reasonable doubt in the 
eyes of the parties on these qualities, which pertain to the 
ver\ essence of arbitral function.´24  
Hong Kong is similar to England and Wales since there 
is no statutory definition of independence or impartiality, 
but it has developed a test for independence and 
impartiality through case law. As defined by the courts, 
impartiality requires a state of mind to be free from any 
influences ³e[traneous to the merits of the particular case, 
which is capable of dispassionate inquiry and an objective 
judgment, and which is not turned aside by any motivation 
to favor one side as against the other.´25  
Once again, case law replaces a statute in Singapore 
regarding a test for impartiality. First, it establishes three 
forms of bias: actual bias, imputed bias, or apparent bias.26 
Actual bias will clearly disqualify an arbitrator from sitting 
on a tribunal. Imputed bias arises when an arbitrator acts 
(or appears to act) in their own interest.27 In this case, if it 
is proven that the arbitrator has even a pecuniary or 
proprietary interest in the case, disqualification is automatic 
 
24 Creighton Limited v. Minister of Finance of Qatar and Minister of 
Municipal Affairs and Agriculture of Qatar, Case No 98-19068 
(Official Case No) (2000) 207 Bulletin civil I, 135 (Other Reference) 
ILDC 772 (FR 2000) (OUP reference). 
25 Supra note 23. 
26 PT Central Investindo v Franciscus Wongso and others and another 
matter, [2014] 4 SLR 978. 
27 Id. 
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without needing to establish whether there is a likelihood or 
suspicion of bias.28 Finally, apparent bias is established 
through a reasonableness test involving a two-step 
inquiry.29 First, the applicant has to establish the factual 
circumstances suggesting the possibility of a biased 
tribunal.30 Second, the court examines whether a 
³h\pothetical fair-minded and informed observer would 
view those circumstances as bearing on the tribunal¶s 
impartialit\ in the resolution of the dispute before it.´31 
Pursuant to section 9 of SZit]erland¶s Arbitration Act 
an arbitrator shall be impartial.32 The circumstances 
establishing possible partiality are outlined in the rest of the 
section ± bearing strong resemblance to the guidelines 
outlined by the IBA regarding conflicts of interest.33 The 
test is also objective, and the subjective impression of the 
parties is not decisive.34 
Defining a conflict of interest as: ³«a direct and 
dependent relationship between the funder and the 
arbitrator where the outcome of the case significantly 
affects: (1) the financial performance, profitability, or share 
price of the funder, or (2) the arbitrator¶s personal financial 
interests,´35  reflects this trend towards adopting an 
objective test regarding impartiality. Further, it takes into 
 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, Ch. 2, Art. 9 (2012). 
33 See Supreme Court Decision 4A_458/2009 of 10 June 2010, ASA 
Bull 3/2010, p. 520; see also Supreme Court Decision 4A_506/2007of 
20 March 2008, ASA Bull 3/2008, p. 565. 
34 Supreme Court Decision 4A_260/2017  of 27 March 2003, ATF 129 
III 445, ASA Bull 3/2003, p. 601. 
35 Refer to previous discussion regarding non-waivable situations. 
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account the fact that arbitrators do not live on the moon.36  
They are real people, who form relationships with their 
colleagues and have a variety of financial interests. Thus, it 
is important to take into consideration the specific type of 
relationship that exists between the funder and the 
arbitrator when determining a conflict of interest. 
IV. Mandatory Disclosure 
A. Helps Avoid Conflicts of Interest Throughout an 
Arbitration 
By requiring parties to simply disclose the existence of 
third-party funding and the name of the funder at the start 
of the arbitration (or within a timely manner if a party 
secures third-party funding during the arbitration), 
arbitrators can make better decisions in determining their 
own propensity for bias, ensuring that awards are more 
enforceable, and increasing trust and participation in the 
arbitral system.  
ICSID is already addressing this issue by proposing 
mandatory disclosure in its new proposed rules 
amendment.37 It imposes a new obligation on the parties to 
disclose ³Zhether the\ have third-party funding, the source 
of the funding, and to keep disclosure of such information 
 
36 Suez v. Vivendia, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 18 Decision on 
Disqualification. (³Arbitrators are not disembodied spirits sZelling on 
Mars, who descend to earth to arbitrate a case and then immediately 
return to their Martian retreat to await inertly the call to arbitrate 
another. Like other professionals living and working in the world, 
arbitrators have a variety of complex connections with all sorts of 
persons and institutions.´) 
37 ICSID Secretariat, Proposals for Amendment of the UCSID Rules ± 
Synopsis, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(August 2, 2018), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments/Documents/Homepage/Am
endments-Vol_1_Synopsis_EN,FR,SP.pdf. 
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current through the proceeding.´38 The LCIA addresses this 
as well, establishing an ongoing duty to disclose 
information about their independence to the ICC,39 or the 
LCIA registrar.40 Other groups, like the Queen Mary Task 
Force are in favor of this idea. In fact, in the Queen Mary 
Report, it states that ³There Zas nearl\ universal agreement 
that disclosure of the identity of a funder is necessary for an 
arbitrator to undertake analysis of potential conflicts of 
interest.´41  At least one funder has acknowledged (perhaps 
reluctantly) that disclosing the funding relationship can be 
helpful in limited circumstances.42 
Reconciling the possibility of conflicts of interest 
arising from third-party funding could involve this four-
part solution: (1) the inclusion of arbitrator relationships 
with third-party funding institutions to be relevant in 
determining an arbitrator¶s independence and impartialit\; 
 
38 Id. (³AR 21 ((AF)AR 32) imposes a neZ obligation on the parties to 
disclose whether they have third-party funding, the source of the 
funding, and to keep such disclosure of information current through the 
proceeding. They are not required to disclose the funding agreement or 
its contents for this purpose. The name of an involved funder will be 
provided to the arbitrators prior to appointment to avoid inadvertent 
conflicts of interest, and the Arbitrator Declaration requires 
confirmation that there is no conflict Zith the named funder.´) 
39 IBA Guidelines General Standard, supra note 11, art. 11(2) (³Before 
appointment or confirmation, a prospective arbitrator shall . . . disclose 
in writing to the Secretariat any facts or circumstances which might be 
of  such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator¶s independence in 
the eyes of the parties, as well as any circumstances that could give rise 
to reasonable doubts as to the arbitrator¶s impartialit\.´). 
40 London Court of International Arbitration, LCIA Arbitration Rules 
art 5.3 (2014). 
41 The ICCA Reports, supra note 1, at 98. 
42 Lisa Bench Nieuwveld, To Disclose or to not Disclose-That is the 
Question, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Apr. 17, 2012), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/04/17/to-disclose-or-
to-not-disclose-that-is-the-question/.  
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(2) parties to disclose to the institution that it is receiving 
third-party funding; (3) a confidential and automatic 
conflicts check done by the institution if it receives notice 
from a party that it is receiving funding; and (4) that the 
arbitral tribunal shall be prohibited from considering the 
existence of a third-party funding relationship when 
determining costs or security for costs.43 However, simply 
proposing a four-part conflicts check guideline does not go 
far enough in establishing the teeth necessary to increase 
the enforceability of awards. Countries should pass 
legislation requiring arbitral parties to disclose the 
existence of funding, because the hard law support of 
arbitration is what makes the system work.         
B. Leads to More Enforceable Awards 
By ensuring that all bases were covered in determining 
bias, it reduces the chances of a successful challenge to the 
tribunal¶s decision. If a court sees that the arbitrator and the 
parties went through proper steps to make sure that all 
potential conflicts of interest were disclosed to the 
arbitrator, then it decreases the chances that a challenge 
will be successful.  
The arbitration community also needs the backing of 
national legislation to add legitimacy and enforceability to 
these disclosure rules. Further, any case law arising out of 
potential mandatory disclosure legislation can provide an 
additional source of guidance to tribunals. Currently no 
national legislation about mandatory disclosure in the 
context of third-party funding exists.44 While arbitration 
 
43 Trusz, supra note 4, at 1673. 
44 See Aren Goldsmith and Lorenzo Melchionda, The ICC¶V GXidance 
Note on Disclosure and Third-Party Funding: A Step in the Right 
Direction, Kluwer Arb. Blog (March 14, 2016), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/03/14/the-iccs-
guidance-note-on-disclosure-and-third-party-funding-a-step-in-the-
THE ARBITRATION BRIEF 
 
 
75 
exists as a way to balance the unwillingness for parties to 
resolve disputes in domestic courts,45 it only works because 
states recognize it as a legitimate dispute resolution tool46 
and enforce arbitral judgments.47  If arbitral judgments 
were largely unenforceable, the entire system would 
collapse. As such, the arbitration community should 
embrace this relationship with domestic law and lean on it 
to lend ensure its longevity.  
Looking at the most popular seats for arbitration: the 
United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong,48 it is clear that national law recognizes 
the need for a check to arbitrator bias.49 By taking an 
additional step to ensure that arbitrators are fully informed 
of any potential conflict of interest, states promote 
neutrality in the system and ensure that unnecessary 
 
right-direction/. 
45 Erin A. O¶Hara and Larr\ E. Ribstein, The Law Market, Oxford 
Universit\ Press (2009), at 85 (³[A]rbitration as a mechanism for 
enabling the parties either to defensively avoid undesirable law or to 
affirmatively choose the law that will govern the parties¶ 
relationship.´). 
46 New York Arbitration Convention, 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (at least 138 countries 
have signed the New York Arbitration Convention, which greatly limits 
the ways in which a contracting state can issue an award and refuse 
enforceability. This was signed on June 10, 1958 at the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter cited as New York 
Convention]. Article II of the New York Convention also provides for 
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.  
47 O¶Hara & Ribstein, supra note 46, at 95. (stating that arbitration 
awards may be more enforceable than court judgments rendered by 
courts outside the US). 
48 Federal Arbitration Act, supra note 21. 
49 Kluwer Arbitration, www.kluwerarbitration.com (last accessed 
December 20, 2018) (Impartiality data gathered using the Kluwer 
Arbitration Database). 
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challenges to awards are prevented from being brought 
forward. 
C. Increases Participation and Trust in the System 
Despite its imperfection, arbitration exists because the 
global community at large recognizes its importance. In an 
age where transactions are global, arbitration¶s greatest 
strength is its neutrality.50 The reassurance of a ³neutral, 
reliable, and effective dispute resolution mechanism´51 
increases the trust needed to promote investment and cross-
border transactions. National legislation requiring parties to 
disclose the existence of third-party funding to an arbitrator 
reassures parties that the tribunal has considered all 
potential conflicts of interest. It reinforces the trust parties 
have placed, for decades, on the neutrality of arbitration. To 
emphasize this point even further, it is helpful to analyze 
the criticisms of mandatory disclosure. 
Some argue that mandatory disclosure of third-party 
funding would replace independent analysis of case-by-
case thinking on the relationships between arbitrators and 
funders,52 that it would lead to split conflicts standards,53 
and that no one would be willing to enforce or participate 
in a mandatory disclosure regime ± ultimately resulting in 
 
50 Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration is Not Arbitration, 2 
Stockholm Int¶l Arb.n Rev. 1, 2 (2008)   (³In international arbitration, 
all of these elements of evaluation fade into relative insignificance 
when contrasted with a criterion that is dominant here although it is, by 
definition, irrelevant in the national context. This alone tells you that 
international arbitration is not arbitration. That unique criterion is 
neutralit\.´).  
51 O¶Hara & Ribstein, supra note 46, at 97. 
52 Jonas von Goeler, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration 
and its Impact on Procedure 291 (Kluwer Law International, 2016).   
53 Id., at 283-84. 
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lower participation.54  
Mandatory disclosure would not discourage 
relationships between arbitrators and funders.55 Instead, 
requiring parties to disclose the existence of third-party 
funding would encourage arbitrators, legislators, judges, 
and parties to constantly evaluate relationships in the 
context of third-party funding. Further, striving for a degree 
of perceived legal certainty in complex cases regarding an 
extremely subjective topic is what the law does. A great 
example of this are the impartiality tests set forth by 
England56, France57, Hong Kong58, Singapore,59 
Switzerland,60 and the United States.61 These tests set forth 
a legal certainty (the type of test to measure impartiality 
and independence) to make sense of a complex and fact-
specific topic. Further, national law requiring parties, rather 
than just encouraging them through institutional peer 
pressure, to disclose the existence of funding, additionally 
encourages them to reflect on third-party funding 
relationships. And it still gives tribunals and courts the 
 
54 Id., at 288.  
55 Id., at 291 (³[S]triving for a degree of perceived legal certaint\ in 
evaluating conflicts of interest . . . would replace independent case by 
case thinking on relationships involving third-party funders in a 
complex world of business and finance.´). 
56 See Roylance v. The General Medical Council PC ([1999] 3 WLR 
541.  
57 Creighton Limited v. Minister of Finance of Qatar and Minister of 
Municipal Affairs and Agriculture of Qatar, Case No 98-19068 
(Official Case No) (2000) 207 Bulletin civil I, 135 (Other Reference) 
ILDC 772 (FR 2000) (OUP reference). 
58 Roylance, supra note 23. 
59 PT Central Investindo v Franciscus Wongso and others and another 
matter [2014] 3 SGHC 190. 
60 Federal Supreme Court of 10 June 2010, ASA Bull 3/2010, 520 and 
of 20 March 2008, ASA Bull 3/2008, 565. 
61 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1947). 
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freedom to consider each case on its merits ± which is one 
of the reasons why parties choose arbitration over domestic 
court systems.   
There is also the argument that it would lead to the 
coexistence of different disclosure regimes creating a lack 
of clarity and split conflicts standards.62 This lack of clarity 
would dissuade parties from participating in systems 
requiring mandatory disclosure because the unknown 
consequences of obtaining third-party funding would 
dissuade investors, parties, and arbitrators from engaging in 
arbitration.63 National legislation requiring mandatory 
disclosure actuall\ removes this ³perceived´ lack of clarit\ 
because of the myriad of case law parties can use as 
guidance when analyzing possible third-party conflicts of 
interest.  
National legislation also helps to sidestep the resistance 
some parties have towards the idea that institutions, 
themselves, should address this issue. James Clanchy, the 
former registrar and deputy director of the LCIA, when 
asked whether arbitral institutions should shoulder the 
burden of clearing potential conflicts of interest between 
arbitrators and third-party funders, was very much against 
the idea.64  He argued that it would be a terrible idea, that it 
would place an unrealistic burden on the institution, and 
that it would lead funders and clients to avoid the rules of 
the institution.65 National legislation mitigates this 
unrealistic burden by placing the enforcement mechanism 
in the hands of the state. This allows arbitral institutions to 
 
62 Goeler, supra note 53, at 284. 
63 Id.  
64 TheJudgeVideo, IA event - Full video, Youtube (July 25, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cwZQvgE1tvQ&feature=youtu.be
&t=3740.  
65 Id. 
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lean on state enforcement methods to require disclosure. 
Further, simply requiring parties to answer a yes or no 
question, then providing only the name of a funder does not 
add any more of a burden on the parties than checking a 
box. 
Of course, some parties might seek to avoid mandatory 
disclosure rules and encourage states to adopt a ³race to the 
bottom´ ± where disclosure is not required, and the rules 
are scarce. However, it is unclear what benefit a party 
would gain from refusing disclosure. Mandatory disclosure 
still protects the confidentiality of the funding agreement. 
Being unwilling to disclose funding, in the hope that if 
the\ lose the\ could ³discover´ a conflict of interest 
between an arbitrator and funder would be a terrible idea. 
Considering that existing institutional and national 
standards for demonstrating the objective appearance of 
bias are so high, it is extremely unlikely that a potential 
challenge would pass muster. Furthermore, more regulation 
does not necessarily result in a marked decrease of 
participation.66 In fact, in high value situations, it makes 
sense that parties would default to rules requiring 
mandatory disclosure because it increases their chance for a 
more enforceable award and reassures parties that a 
significant element in determining the existence of a 
conflict of interest is taken care of. Further, mandatory 
disclosure still protects the confidentiality of the funding 
agreements by prohibiting disclosure of the terms of the 
agreement. Further, courts have been reluctant to look at 
funding agreements unless the agreement itself is under 
scrutiny.67 While requiring parties to give up the name of 
 
66 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 
supra note 5.  
67 Press Release, Oxus Gold PLC, Litigation Funding (March 1, 2012) 
(Oxus issued a press release disclosing recourse to third-party funding 
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the funder, it still keeps the terms of the relationship 
confidential, reassuring funders that tribunals will not take 
the name of a funder into its decisions for regarding 
security for costs or fee shifting.68 This incentivizes third-
party funders to be more comfortable with parties 
disclosing the name of the funder, and can in fact, 
encourage parties to arbitrate in those jurisdictions because 
the confidential nature of their agreement can be kept 
intact. 69  
V. Conclusion: Third-party Funding is Here to Stay  
Issues arising from third-party funding should not be 
ignored, not just because of the ethical implications, but 
also because of the sheer amount of money involved. With 
judgments reaching in the billions of dollars,70 more money 
 
and revealed details of the funding agreement); Sehil v. Turkmenistan, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6, Procedural Order, 3 ICSID 1, 1 (June 12, 
2015) (The tribunal ordered the claimant to disclose the identity of the 
funder. It also ordered disclosure of the µnature¶ of the funding 
arrangement, including the funder¶s rate of return if the claimant is 
successful in its claims) 
68 See ATA Constr., Indus. & Trading Co. v. Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/02, Order Taking Note of the 
Discontinuance of the Proceeding 7ICSID (July 11, 2011); RSM Prod. 
Corp. v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Order of the 
Committee Discontinuing the Proceeding and Decision on Costs,  48 
ICSID (Apr. 28, 2011); Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. 
ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, Award, 691 ICSID (Mar. 3, 2010).  
69 Trusz, supra note 4, at 1652. 
70 As an example, the UNCITRAL decided three awards (referred to as 
Yukos v. The Russian Federation) in 2014 ordering Russia to pay USD 
$50 billion. The awards are as follows: Hulley Enterprises Limited 
(Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation,PCA Case No. AA 226, Final 
Award (July 18, 2014).; Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The 
Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Final Award, (July 18, 
2014. ; Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, 
PCA Case No. AA 228, Final Award (July 18, 2014). 
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means more complications and more problems.71 
Especially when looking at investor-state arbitration, and 
particularly cases where the state has lost, taxpayers end up 
shouldering the burden of the judgment. As such, states 
have a legitimate interest in making sure that procedures 
are in place that can limit the possibility of unmeritorious 
claims being dragged out. Further, the support states can 
lend to the entire institution of arbitration goes beyond just 
enforcing judgments, it can help provide binding stop gap 
measures that increase (to a useful extent) transparency and 
neutrality in a fairly closed a confidential system. 
 
 
 
 
71 The Notorious B.I.G., Mo Money Mo Problems, Life After Death 
(Bad Boy Records 1997). 
